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World: r3wp

[!REBOL3-OLD1]

Pekr
5-Jun-2007
[3354]
You could do that in one hour, for me - I did not find any help, 
and it was show stopper for me.
Gabriele
5-Jun-2007
[3355x4]
we don't want to turn into perl, that's my only concern. otherwise 
we'd just go to perl and have all the new people you want.
good design is about what to leave out.
now... why not having x509 parsing in rebol? that's surely possible 
and probably a good thing to do. but, tomorrow you'll find something 
else that's missing.
so, nothing really would change.
Pekr
5-Jun-2007
[3359]
I remember exactly the same discussions when Terry was proposing 
RASH - we claimed we could do everything Flash can. Yes, in teory. 
But there is many ppl, who look for new tools in internet era. Some 
of them, don't want to code drivers etc. themself. In fact - they 
choose upon what is available. To avoid this situation, I propose 
bounty system, it would be vital. So guy like me could take some 
money and sponsor some development.
Gabriele
5-Jun-2007
[3360x2]
it's not like adding x509 parsing changes the world.
expecially since someone may not be using x509 at all
Pekr
5-Jun-2007
[3362]
Ah, so you talk all the time, if something should be part of "standard" 
rebol or not? Well, that is misunderstanding. I don't require something 
to be included. I am ok with extensions, libraries.
Gabriele
5-Jun-2007
[3363x6]
and why should RT write all the libraries?
if i needed that really quick, i would just CALL openssl
[giesse-:-batou]:/etc/ssl/certs$ openssl x509 -text -in Visa_eCommerce_Root.pem
Certificate:
    Data:
        Version: 3 (0x2)
        Serial Number:
            13:86:35:4d:1d:3f:06:f2:c1:f9:65:05:d5:90:1c:62
        Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption

        Issuer: C=US, O=VISA, OU=Visa International Service Association, 
        CN=Visa eCommerce Root
        Validity
            Not Before: Jun 26 02:18:36 2002 GMT
            Not After : Jun 24 00:16:12 2022 GMT

        Subject: C=US, O=VISA, OU=Visa International Service Association, 
        CN=Visa eCommerce Root
        Subject Public Key Info:
            Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
            RSA Public Key: (2048 bit)
                Modulus (2048 bit):
                    00:af:57:de:56:1e:6e:a1:da:60:b1:94:27:cb:17:
                    db:07:3f:80:85:4f:c8:9c:b6:d0:f4:6f:4f:cf:99:
                    d8:e1:db:c2:48:5c:3a:ac:39:33:c7:1f:6a:8b:26:
                    3d:2b:35:f5:48:b1:91:c1:02:4e:04:96:91:7b:b0:
                    33:f0:b1:14:4e:11:6f:b5:40:af:1b:45:a5:4a:ef:
                    7e:b6:ac:f2:a0:1f:58:3f:12:46:60:3c:8d:a1:e0:
                    7d:cf:57:3e:33:1e:fb:47:f1:aa:15:97:07:55:66:
                    a5:b5:2d:2e:d8:80:59:b2:a7:0d:b7:46:ec:21:63:
                    ff:35:ab:a5:02:cf:2a:f4:4c:fe:7b:f5:94:5d:84:
                    4d:a8:f2:60:8f:db:0e:25:3c:9f:73:71:cf:94:df:
                    4a:ea:db:df:72:38:8c:f3:96:bd:f1:17:bc:d2:ba:
                    3b:45:5a:c6:a7:f6:c6:17:8b:01:9d:fc:19:a8:2a:
                    83:16:b8:3a:48:fe:4e:3e:a0:ab:06:19:e9:53:f3:
                    80:13:07:ed:2d:bf:3f:0a:3c:55:20:39:2c:2c:00:
                    69:74:95:4a:bc:20:b2:a9:79:e5:18:89:91:a8:dc:
                    1c:4d:ef:bb:7e:37:0b:5d:fe:39:a5:88:52:8c:00:
                    6c:ec:18:7c:41:bd:f6:8b:75:77:ba:60:9d:84:e7:
                    fe:2d
                Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)
        X509v3 extensions:
            X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical
                CA:TRUE
            X509v3 Key Usage: critical
                Certificate Sign, CRL Sign
            X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:

                15:38:83:0F:3F:2C:3F:70:33:1E:CD:46:FE:07:8C:20:E0:D7:C3:B7
    Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption
        5f:f1:41:7d:7c:5c:08:b9:2b:e0:d5:92:47:fa:67:5c:a5:13:
        c3:03:21:9b:2b:4c:89:46:cf:59:4d:c9:fe:a5:40:b6:63:cd:
        dd:71:28:95:67:11:cc:24:ac:d3:44:6c:71:ae:01:20:6b:03:
        a2:8f:18:b7:29:3a:7d:e5:16:60:53:78:3c:c0:af:15:83:f7:
        8f:52:33:24:bd:64:93:97:ee:8b:f7:db:18:a8:6d:71:b3:f7:
        2c:17:d0:74:25:69:f7:fe:6b:3c:94:be:4d:4b:41:8c:4e:e2:
        73:d0:e3:90:22:73:43:cd:f3:ef:ea:73:ce:45:8a:b0:a6:49:
        ff:4c:7d:9d:71:88:c4:76:1d:90:5b:1d:ee:fd:cc:f7:ee:fd:
        60:a5:b1:7a:16:71:d1:16:d0:7c:12:3c:6c:69:97:db:ae:5f:
        39:9a:70:2f:05:3c:19:46:04:99:20:36:d0:60:6e:61:06:bb:
        16:42:8c:70:f7:30:fb:e0:db:66:a3:00:01:bd:e6:2c:da:91:
        5f:a0:46:8b:4d:6a:9c:3d:3d:dd:05:46:fe:76:bf:a0:0a:3c:
        e4:00:e6:27:b7:ff:84:2d:de:ba:22:27:96:10:71:eb:22:ed:
        df:df:33:9c:cf:e3:ad:ae:8e:d4:8e:e6:4f:51:af:16:92:e0:
        5c:f6:07:0f
how much would it take to extract the key and signature from that?
having more time, i'd just study the binary file format and parse 
it myself. i don't see any show-stopper.
but again, assume this was built in, or available as library from 
rt. you would simply find something else that is not built in and 
complain about that :)
Pekr
5-Jun-2007
[3369]
Where were you when I needed the help? :-)
Terry
5-Jun-2007
[3370x2]
any word on library access for R3.. is it free now?
otherwise CALL is the only way to go
Gabriele
5-Jun-2007
[3372x2]
terry, yes afaik. not discussed yet though.
petr, am i really the only one who could do that? :)
Terry
5-Jun-2007
[3374]
you  'da man Gab
Pekr
5-Jun-2007
[3375]
OK, I will ask the other way? How would you trust I am me? (or how 
to write it in english), if not to trust some third party = CA? IIRC 
Carl or Josh said, that new SDK (dunno if it was ment generally, 
or only for plug-in), could generate some special license key or 
certificate for me, so that users could check? Similar aproach as 
when you install driver and you have the ability to check, if it 
comes from trusted party. That was all my point why I asked if it 
is coming.
Gabriele
5-Jun-2007
[3376x5]
plug in - that's ActiveX signing. it's a MS thing mainly.
rebol side - just use rsa signature as shown in rebol.com docs. ie 
just add signature to your rebol script
then i only need to know your public key.
since i need to be sure that the public key i have i yours, and not 
someone else, we need a trusted party - that's called a CA
ie someone that certifies that you are actually Petr and not an impostor
Pekr
5-Jun-2007
[3381]
Gabriele - probably so, because IIRC guys pointed me to be able to 
parse ... uhm, don't remember what it was ...
Gabriele
5-Jun-2007
[3382x2]
that can be done 100% in rebol. if you need to interoperate with 
other systems, then you need to parse their formats, eg x509.
but... it's just parsing. it would be nice to have built in... but 
i don't see it as show stopper.
Pekr
5-Jun-2007
[3384]
I know - but do you think ppl will trust some home made CA? I thought 
that I will come to one of three CAs here, and will ask for commercial 
certificate (dunno who does so internationally - Thawte? Verison?)
Gabriele
5-Jun-2007
[3385x3]
Verisign etc. But it depends on the app.
in general, yes, you have to support the big guys like Verisign... 
but that really depends on the app itself.
eg. if we're talking about the employees in your company, your company 
could be your CA, since you already trust your own company to some 
degree
Pekr
5-Jun-2007
[3388]
There is no other level, as how to build "trust" amongst ppl in open 
environment.
Gabriele
5-Jun-2007
[3389x3]
i can only say, that i haven't encountered the need to parse x509 
so far.
otherwise... i would have solved the problem in some way... it's 
just parsing. worst case you call out to some known good parser like 
openssl
and if you don't even want to trust rebol's internal rsa code... 
you can call openssl for everything. that code is trusted by all
Pekr
5-Jun-2007
[3392]
Yes, I know. But imagine me being an evil man. I will register with 
RT. They have their own CA, register me, give me certificate. I will 
do evil script. PPL will trust me, run the script, and damage will 
come. They turn to RT, and RT tells them - that developer is Petr 
Krenzelok. And I say - what? I never registered. So, the only way 
of RT to know I am who I am is, that I will visit some CA, provide 
some evidence (ID card, driving license, passport), and register, 
no?
Gabriele
5-Jun-2007
[3393]
that's correct, RT should never certify you are you without having 
proof.
Pekr
5-Jun-2007
[3394]
What I am talking all the time about is - how to build trust in distributed 
environment. Some of us will need to produce scripts with lowered 
security. If I see a requestor asking me for lowering security, I 
will not run the app, unless I can be sure, that it comes from Gabriele 
for e.g., and that if Gabriele ruins my HD data, I can visit DevCon 
next year and ask for refundation :-))
Gabriele
5-Jun-2007
[3395x4]
a digital certificate is just like a paper certificate - the value 
depends on the issuers, and the parties involved.
someone may trust a document signed by me, someone else will need 
an official document from some state authority.
trust is generally based on chains
i trust you because someone else i already trust trustes you.
Pekr
5-Jun-2007
[3399]
in order to be able to verify certificate, you need to verify it 
against the root certificate of CA. So if RT becomes CA for its developers, 
it would be better for them to be able to verify, who asks for certificate. 
E.g. visit devcon in private, for Carl to be sure who you are :-)
Gabriele
5-Jun-2007
[3400]
basically, since you are running rebol.exe, you are trusting rt already.
Pekr
5-Jun-2007
[3401]
yes, rebol.exe could do damage in the extent of my OS user priviledges.
Gabriele
5-Jun-2007
[3402]
so, if rt can identify me (eg in person at devcon like you say) and 
tell you via certificate that a script is really from me (identification 
+ authentication), you can then trust the script if you trust me
Pekr
5-Jun-2007
[3403]
hmm, host executable is open sourced, right? Who will be officila 
provider of such exe?